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Jan. 19, 1993).
Defendant moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the
plaintiff's copyright infringement action was barred by prescription under the Copyright Act of 1976 because the defendant committed no direct acts of infringement during the three year period
immediately preceding the filing of this lawsuit. 17 U.S.C. §507(b)
states that no infringement action can be brought under the provisions of the Act "unless it is commenced within three years after
the claim accrued." Defendant claims that even if plaintiff had any
claim against him, the claim had accrued more than three years
ago and is thus barred by prescription. Defendant presented evidence indicating that he had officially severed his relationship with
the co-defendants in the music business more than six years before
the filing of the lawsuit. Thus, the claim could not have accrued
against him within the last three years. For the purposes of prescription under the Copyright Act of 1976, there has been conflict
among the circuits as to whether or not the accrual of a claim can
be applied to acts of infringement not directly committed by the
defendant during that three year period.
Held: Copyright infringement is a continuing wrong, and
therefore the statute of limitations in 17 U.S.C. §507(b) does not
begin to run "until three years after the last alleged infringing
act." "The plaintiff's interest in avoiding successive lawsuits outweighs the court's interest in avoiding evidentiary problems and
the defendant's interest in being free from suit long after the alleged offense." Motion denied.
P.J.
TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT
92-CV-6517L, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
913 (W.D.N.Y. Jan. 25, 1993).

BAUSCH & LOMB V. NEVITT,

Manufacturer of Ray-Ban sunglasses sued for trademark infringement, false designation of origin, unfair competition, and false
advertising. Defendant developed a line of sunglasses which use
the name Rayex written in a script design as its logo. The glasses
were intended to be less expensive duplicates of Ray-Ban sunglasses. To succeed on a motion for preliminary injunction in
trademark infringement, plaintiff had to establish that its trademark was entitled to protection and that a likelihood of confusion
existed. In deciding whether there is a likelihood of confusion, the
court is guided by a non-exclusive list of eight factors known collectively as the Polaroid factors.
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Held: Where the words "ray" and "ban" are joined together by
a hyphen, they gain a new meaning which is suggestive of the
product the name identifies. The plaintiff's script design "RayBan" logo is entitled to protection under the Lanham Act. Further,
a balancing of the Polaroid factors establishes a likelihood of confusion. Defendant's script design does infringe the "Ray-Ban"
trademark and is enjoined from further use. In addition, the defendant's use of the "like/love" slogan will likely exacerbate consumer confusion and is also enjoined from use in Rayex advertising. Injunction granted against Defendant.
H.C.
COPYRIGHT LAW - BROADCAST LICENSE FEES
UNITED STATES V. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF COMPOSERS, AUTHORS

AND PUBLISHERS, ET AL., Civ.

13-95 (WCC), 1993 U.S. Dist.

LEXIS 2566; 1993-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P70,153; (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
Suit was filed on behalf of almost one thousand independent or
network-affiliated television stations throughout the United
States seeking a judicial determination of the fees that they
should pa3 the American Society of Composers, Authors, and
Publishers (ASCAP) for the public performance of copyrighted
music found in ASCAP's repertoire. The television stations sought
a blanket license fee applicable from February 1, 1983 through December 31, 1985, and a per-program license fee from April 1, 1985
through December 31, 1995. The television stations and ASCAP
differed widely on what the amount of those fees should be.
Held: The court determined what the appropriate time period
should be for calculating the blanket license fees and per-program
fees. Furthermore, the court determined how these should be determined and their limitations. Specifically, per-program fees are
not triggered unless ASCAP music is played after the commencement or conclusion of a program (excluding commercials, public
service announcements, promotional announcements, and music
accompanying the producer's logo at the commencement or conclusion of the program). The court left the question of how to allocate
the blanket license fees among the stations up to the parties.
E.A.
United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 89 Civ. 8067 (PKL),
1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3479 (N.Y. S.D. 1993).
United Feature Syndicate, Inc. (UFS) brought suit against Jeff
Koons for alleged copyright infringement, dilution, and unfair
competition based upon Koons' production of four identical
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